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"Our System Is Broken":1 A Study Of The
Crisis Facing The Death-Eligible Defendant
INTRODUCTION

n accomplished physician in a reputable metropolitan hospital has
been assigned to perform major surgery on a member of your
family. Though this operation is very dangerous, and may result in
death, the physician has assured you that he will make every effort to
ensure that the surgery is successful. Unbeknownst to you, the physician
has an alcohol problem. The evening before the surgery, the physician
consumes at least twelve shots of 80-proof rum, and continues to drink
until he passes out. The physician performs the surgery and "forgets" to
perform a critical part of the operation. Because of these complications,
the patient dies. What would you do? Would you consider the physician
effective in performing his surgical duties? Or would you claim that his
alcohol problem caused the death of your relative? Many persons would
believe that the physician's alcohol problem contributed to the death of
their family member. But when it comes to the death of a criminal
defendant, most courts would view this situation differently.
At Ronald Wayne Frye's capital trial the court found that Frye's
attorney was effective. The attorney consumed alcohol every evening of
the trial, like the physician in the hypothetical, often drinking until he
passed out. 2 The attorney was involved in a car wreck during the same
time period, and his blood alcohol level was 0.436, over four times the
legal limit of most states, though he had not consumed alcohol for several
hours prior to the accident. 3 Nevertheless, the court found that the
alcoholic attorney had effectively assisted the defendant, and had
adequately advocated the defendant's cause. Frye was executed on August
31, 2001.4

1.

Ron Hutcheson, Public Unease Won 't Let Death Penalty Issue Fade, SAN
June 17, 2000, at A-1. This statement was made by Illinois Governor
George Ryan, who imposed a moratorium on executions on January 31, 2000.
2.
North Carolina Executes Inmate Represented by Alcoholic Lawyer, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/whatsnew.html/#ncfrye (last visited Sep. 10, 2002).
3.
Id. Counsel for Frye openly admitted that he consumed at least 12 shots of 80proof rum every evening. He also admitted that he drank even more on the weekends. Id.
4.
Id.
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Courts have been reluctant to find instances of ineffective assistance
of counsel.5 Even in capital cases, most claims of ineffective assistance are
dismissed as "tactical decisions" or nonprejudicial error.6 This article
explores the inadequacy of counsel at capital trials. Part I details Strickland
v. Washington,7 in which the Supreme Court established the standard for
ineffective assistance and its repercussions. Part II cites general statistics
about the death penalty and current opinions regarding capital punishment.
Part III offers examples of common errors made by attorneys in capital
cases. Part IV addresses certain egregious examples of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Part V examines possible reasons why capital
defendants receive low quality representation. Part VI analyzes legislation
that has been enacted to ensure adequate representation in capital cases,
and determines whether this legislation has been effective. Part VII of this
article suggests a proposal for reform to ensure competent representation

for capital defendants.
I.

A.

THE STANDARD FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON

The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the
right to counsel at trial. 8 This right was first recognized in Powell v.
Alabama.9 Thirty-eight years later the Supreme Court noted that "the right

5.
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall...
have the [alssistance of [c]ounsel for his defen[s]e.").
9.
287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority,
noted:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if
it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the
science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge [to adequately]
prepare his defense, even though he may have a perfect one. He
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to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel."' Strickland v.
Washington"I was the first case in which the Supreme Court fully
articulated the contours of the right to effective assistance of counsel.
In Strickland, the defendant was charged with three counts of capital
murder.' 2 The defendant pled guilty to all charges, against the advice of his
attorney13 In preparation for the sentencing hearing, defense counsel
spoke to the defendant's wife and mother, but neglected to seek out any
character witnesses.' 4 Counsel also failed to present a psychiatric report
discussing the defendant's character and mental state.15 Lastly, counsel did
not order a presentence report.' 6 Defendant alleged that counsel was
ineffective for failing to do these things.
In considering the defendant's claim, the Supreme Court briefly
addressed the fact that this case involved a capital offense. The Court
stated that a capital sentencing hearing is comparable to counsel's role at a
non-capital trial - "to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to
produce a just result under the standards governing decision."' 7 From this
basis, the Court found no distinction between capital and non-capital
defendants for the purpose of determining whether counsel was
ineffective.' 8
The Supreme Court noted that the representation of a criminal
defendant requires basic duties, such as a duty to advocate the defendant's
cause and a duty to bring the skill and knowledge necessary to ensure that
the trial is a "reliable adversarial testing process."' 9 The Court also found
that judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance should be highly

requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 68-69.
10. Mann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (holding that "if the right to
counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to
the mercies of incompetent counsel").
11.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
12. Id. at 672.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 673.
15. Id.
16. Id. Counsel did not request a presentence report because the defendant had told
the trial judge that he had no significant criminal record. The production of a presentence
report would have detailed the defendant's criminal history, and belied the claim that
defendant did not have a significant prior criminal record. Id.
17. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
18. Id. See also infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court's "death is different" doctrine.
19. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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deferential. 20 A strong presumption was created in favor of the finding that
counsel's performance was reasonable professional assistance. 21 This
reticent stance was due in part to the fact that attorneys must make tactical
decisions that best suit the facts and issues of each case.22 As the Court
stated, "[riepresentation is an art, and an act or omission that is
'2 3
unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another."
In attempting to formulate a uniform standard to assess counsel's
performance, the Court found that a strict rules-based standard or a
checklist-based standard would restrict the latitude counsel must have in
making strategic decisions.24 In addition, no set of rules could be
comprehensive enough to cover every situation that an attorney may
encounter.25 Instead, the Supreme Court articulated a two-prong test to
determine whether counsel was ineffective. The defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient, and that this deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant.26 The second prong requires a showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
that is, a trial whose result is reliable.2 7
B.

ISN'T DEATH STILL "DIFFERENT"?

Interestingly, Strickland abandoned the Court's doctrine that "death is
different, 28 insofar as the issue of the effectiveness of counsel. The "death
is different" doctrine has typically required a higher degree of reliability in
trial and sentencing proceedings. 29 According to this doctrine, the death
penalty does not differ in degree, but in kind.30 Because the death penalty
is so different from all other penalties, individualized decisions in capital

20. Id. at 689.
21.
Id. "Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation [of whether
counsel was ineffective], a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance .. " Id.
22.
Id. at 691.
23.
Id. at 693.
24.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
25.
Id. at 688-89.
26.
Id. at 687.
27. Id.
28.
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 322-23 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
29. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411-12 (1986).
30.
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04.
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cases are essential. 31 Death is different in that it is irreversible; therefore,
the fairness of the trial should be carefully monitored and scrutinized.32
Additionally, the death penalty is the "ultimate" penalty, as opposed to
penalties which involve a period of confinement, no matter how long that
period of confinement may be.33
Though the Supreme Court has asserted this doctrine since 1972,
Strickland does not mention the fundamental differences between capital
and non-capital punishment. Because of this doctrine, the Court might
have been expected to discuss whether the standard for ineffective counsel
in capital and non-capital cases should be the same, whether the meaning of
"prejudice" should be the same in both types of cases, and whether the role
of counsel in a capital case differs from the guilt phase to the sentencing
phase.34
C.

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE STRICKLAND STANDARD

The Stricklandstandard for ineffective counsel is almost impossible to
meet. The burden rests with the defendant to satisfy both prongs of the test
to prove that his or her counsel was ineffective.35 Showing that counsel's
performance was deficient, which is the first prong of the Strickland test,
may not cause much difficulty.
The prejudice requirement, however,
poses great difficulty for defendants asserting a claim of ineffective
assistance. The prejudice requirement mandates a showing that trial
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
and to undermine confidence in the result of the trial.36 Clearly, the
prejudice prong is the most difficult element of the test to meet, especially
in light of the extreme deference to counsel.37
Proponents of the Strickland standard assert that this difficult standard
helps to increase judicial efficiency. 38 By instituting a high standard to
establish ineffective assistance, fewer defendants will bring this claim

31. Id. at 304.
32. Id. at 304-05, 323 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
34. Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The
Evolving Standardof Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 323, 333.
35. Strickland,466 U.S. at 697.
36. See id. at 695.
37. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text for a discussion on the deference
granted to counsel as a result of the Strickland decision.
38. See generally Strickland,466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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knowing they will be unable to prove that their attorney was ineffective.
Allowing fewer claims of ineffectiveness will increase judicial efficiency.
The argument that Strickland fosters judicial efficiency loses much
credibility in the criminal arena. The assertion ignores the rule that in most
jurisdictions criminal defendants, both capital and non-capital, are allowed
at least one appeal as of right. 39 Indeed, thirty-six of the thirty-eight states
imposing capital punishment in 1999 provided mandatory review of all
death sentences. 40 Because this appeal is automatically allowed, courts are
required to review the defendant's case, whether or not it asserts a claim of
ineffective assistance. Though non-capital cases may still be appealed to
the state high court seeking relief on the basis of ineffective assistance,
these appeals are not granted as of right. Most state supreme courts choose
whether they will hear a non-capital case. Therefore, in criminal cases,
judicial efficiency is not furthered by the stringent Stricklandtest.
Advocates of the Strickland standard also emphasize the positive
effect that this rigid standard has for attorneys. Because of this standard,
attorneys have the freedom to make tactical decisions without worrying
that their decisions will be found to constitute "ineffective" assistance.4'
Attorneys can base their strategy on the facts before them, and the
circumstances of their defendant, rather than focusing on whether their
decision may prove to be ineffective assistance.
Although this argument does have merit, an interesting dilemma is
presented. Whose rights should be protected in this situation? The rights
of the defendant to a fair trial, or the interests of the attorney in making

39. See Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, at 128 (1st Cir. 1987) (summarizing
appellate provisions for criminal defendants on a state by state basis. This case reveals that
forty-seven of the fifty states provide criminal defendants with at least one appeal as of
right.) But see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894) (holding that criminal
defendant has no right to appeal a conviction under the United States Constitution); Jones v.
Barnes, 493 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (reaffirming that criminal defendants have no right under
the United States Constitution to appeal a conviction). See also Murry v. Giarratano, 492
U.S. 1, 22-23 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (affirming that there is no right to an appeal
but that the unique nature of the death penalty enhances the importance of the appellate
process); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 167 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(affirming that there is no right to an appeal, but arguing that appellate review of capital
cases should be constitutionally mandated to ensure that the death penalty is not imposed
arbitrarily or capriciously).
40. See United States Department of Justice, Capital Punishment 1999, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/cp99.txt (last visited Sep. 16, 2002) [hereinafter
Capital Punishment 1999]. However, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Tennessee
require review of the sentence only. Id. This review is usually conducted by the state's
highest court, regardless of the defendant's wishes. Id. In South Carolina, the defendant
may waive review of his or her sentence if the defendant is deemed to be competent. Id.
41. See Strickland, 446 U.S. at 691.
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strategic decisions? It seems that the defendant should garner more
protection than the attorney. The capital defendant has a greater interest at
stake at his trial - the possible loss of his life. Additionally, because the
defendant will, in effect, bear the brunt of the consequences of his
attorney's errors, the defendant seems to deserve a higher level of
protection than his lawyer.
II.

A.

THE STATS AND THE STATEMENTS

GENERAL DEATH PENALTY STATISTICS

In order to understand the magnitude of the crisis present in death
penalty jurisprudence, one must examine how many persons are affected by
this calamity, and which states may be larger contributors to this dilemma
than others. Since 1977, after the Supreme Court decision in Gregg v.
Georgia42 reinstated the death penalty, 683 persons have been executed
under state death sentences.4 3 The southern region of the United States,
which includes Texas, has executed 557 persons, accounting for 82% of the
total executions." The midwest region has executed sixty-nine persons,
and the western region fifty-four persons.45 The northeast region, in
contrast, has executed only three persons since 1977, all occurring in
Pennsylvania.4 6
The state of Texas is the unparalleled leader in the number of
executions, having executed 239 persons since the death penalty was

in

42.
43.

the

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
United States Department of Justice, PrisonersExecuted Under Civil Authority

United

States,

by

Year,

Region,

and

Jurisdiction,

1977-2000,

at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dtdata.htm#cp (last visited Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
PrisonersExecuted].
44. Capital Punishment 1999, supra note 40. For purposes of this study, the
southern region of the United States includes: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. Id.
45. Id. The midwestern region includes: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Id.
The western region is comprised of: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
46. Id. The northeastern region of the United States encompasses: Connecticut,
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, and Vermont. Id.
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reinstated.47 Other states executing a significant number of persons include
Virginia, Missouri, Florida, and Oklahoma.48 Several states have executed
less than five persons since 1977, including Ohio, Tennessee, Kentucky,
and Wyoming.49
Despite the relatively small number of inmates executed, the number
of inmates sentenced to death is quite large. Although less than 700
persons have been executed since Gregg,5 ° 3527 inmates in the state
prisons are currently under a sentence of death. 5' Surprisingly, California
houses the largest number of prisoners on death row, accounting for nearly
16% of the total.5 2 Texas, of course, is not far behind, boasting 460
holding 13% of those currently sentenced to
inmates awaiting execution,
53
death in the United States.
Eighty-five inmates were executed in 2000, which is a 13% decrease
from 1999.54 Though this reduction seems impressive, the decrease must
be considered in light of the fact that the number of prisoners executed in
1999 was the largest annual number since 1951.55 All ninety-eight persons
executed in 1999 were male. 56 Sixty-two percent of the men executed were
white, while 34% were African American.57 Two American Indians and
two Asians comprised the remaining 4%.58 Ninety-six percent of these
executions were carried out by lethal injection.59
Lethal injection is currently the predominant method of execution,
although sixteen states authorize alternate methods such as lethal gas,
hanging, and a firing squad. 60 Generally, the method can be chosen by the
condemned prisoner, but a few states dictate which method must be used,

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 428 U.S. 153.
51. CapitalPunishment 1999, supra note 40.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. PrisonersExecuted, supra note 43.
55. Capital Punishment 1999, supra note 40. The number of prisoners on death
row has steadily increased over recent years. For example, in 1980, 692 inmates were on
death row. By 1990, this number skyrocketed to 2346 inmates, and continues to climb. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Lethal injection is used by 34 states that impose the death penalty. Eleven
states have authorized electrocution, and three states allow the defendant to be hanged. An
additional three states allow a firing squad as a permissible means of execution.
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depending upon the date of sentencing. 61 The majority of the inmates
whose lives will likely end by lethal injection assert at least one similar
claim on appeal: ineffective assistance of counsel.
B.

CURRENT OPINIONS REGARDING DEATH PENALTY COUNSEL

Ineffective representation for capital defendants has become a hotly
debated topic during recent years. In 1997, the -American Bar Association
("ABA") passed a moratorium resolution, calling for all states imposing the
death penalty to halt executions until all death penalty cases are
administrated fairly and impartially. 62 One of the primary goals of the
moratorium resolution involved decreasing the risk of executing innocent
persons. As part of the resolution, the ABA established guidelines for
competent representation.63 Unfortunately, no state has adopted these
standards.
In addition to the moratorium resolution, several prominent justices
and scholars have noted the crisis facing death-eligible defendants. Ruth
Bader Ginsburg recently noted: "I have yet to see a death case among the
dozens coming to the Supreme Court ...in which the defendant was well
represented at trial .... People who are well represented at trial do not get
the death penalty."'
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has also voiced
concerns regarding the administration of the death penalty. 65 On July 3,
2001, at the Minnesota Women Lawyers' Conference, Justice O'Connor,
who wrote the majority opinion in Strickland, remarked that serious
questions exist regarding whether the death penalty is being administered
fairly in this country.66 Seas
She also stated that far too often the quality of
defense lawyers for capital defendants has been inadequate.67 At the

61.
CapitalPunishment 1999, supra note 40.
62. See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text for further discussion on the
ABA's proposed moratorium.
63. See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
ABA Guidelines.
64. InadequateRepresentation,at http://www.aclu.org/death-penalty/
BadCounsel.html (last visited Sep. 5, 2002).
65. See
Senator
Feingold
on
O'Connor's
Statement,
at
http://www.deathpenalty.org/facts/Feingold_0%27Connor.shtml (last visited Sep. 5, 2002).
66. See O'Connor Expresses Serious Doubts About Death Penalty, USA TODAY,
July 3, 2001, at A3. See also Maria Elena Baca, O'Connor Criticalof Death Penalty: The
First Female Supreme Court Justice Spoke in Minneapolis to a Lawyers' Group, STAR
TRIB., (Minneapolis), July 3, 2001, at IA.
67. See Baca, supra note 66.
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annual conference, Justice O'Connor noted that a significant gap in legal
defense existed between those death-eligible defendants who can afford
private counsel and those who cannot. 68 Justice O'Connor commented that
capital defendants in Texas who were represented by appointed attorneys
were 28% more likely to be convicted than those who had retained their
own attorneys. 69
Additionally, those convicted while under the
representation of an appointed attorney were 44% more likely to be
sentenced to death than those convicted who had retained their own
attorneys.7 ° Justice O'Connor declared that it was "time to look at
minimum standards for appointed counsel in death cases
and adequate
71
compensation for appointed counsel when they are used.,
Justice O'Connor seems to have joined the opinion of former Supreme
Court Justice Blackmun, who now opposes the imposition of the death
penalty. One of the reasons asserted by Justice Blackmun for his refusal to
support the death penalty directly addressed the Strickland standard. As he
noted: "Ten years after the articulation of [the Strickland] standard,
practical experience establishes that the Strickland test, in application, has
failed to protect a defendant's right to be represented
by something more
72
lawyer.''
a
be
to
happens
who
person
than 'a
Former Supreme Court Justices Brennan and Marshall have also
consistently opposed capital punishment. However, their opposition does
not rest on the concerns of ineffective assistance of counsel. Justice
Brennan's opposition to capital punishment extends primarily from
concerns of respect for human dignity. In Gregg v. Georgia,73 for example,
Justice Brennan explained his refusal to advocate the death penalty. "The
fatal constitutional infirmity in the punishment of death is that it treats
'members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and
discarded. [It is] .. .inconsistent with the fundamental premise ... that
even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common
human dignity.' ' 74 Justice Marshall, on the other hand, bases his

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. MacFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1259 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685).
73. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
74. Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a more detailed examination of Justice
Brennan's philosophical considerations regarding the imposition of the death penalty, see
Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment: A Critiqueof the Politicaland Philosophical
Thought Supportingthe Justices'Positions,24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1992).
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opposition to the death penalty on a utilitarian theory.7 5 Marshall also
made his refusal to support the death penalty known in Gregg, citing two
reasons in defense of his decision: "First, the death penalty is excessive.
And second, the American people, fully informed as to the purposes of the
death penalty and its liabilities, would in my view reject it as morally
unacceptable."7 6

Though several prominent justices and scholars recognize that
problems exist in the area of capital punishment, especially in the realm of
assistance of counsel, no effective remedy has been implemented. The
deplorable assistance of counsel to most capital defendants is still
prevalent. The next part of this article will discuss, in greater detail, where
the errors in capital trials are likely to manifest.
III. WHERE ARE THE PROBLEMS?
In order to determine the appropriate course of action to improve
counsel's performance at death penalty trials, it becomes necessary to
determine where the major problems with the attorney's representation lie.
Generally, in the case of indigents, when claims of ineffective assistance
are asserted on appeal, the errors are spotted and researched by another
state-appointed attorney. Part III looks to the common errors asserted by
capital defendants on appeal.
A.

PRETRIAL

Of those defendants asserting ineffective assistance claims,
approximately twenty percent of these claims involve actions or omissions
by their attorney prior to trial.77 Many of these alleged errors involved the
failure to file a motion. Types of motions that were not filed include a
motion to suppress, motion for change of venue, motion to sever, and

75. See Donnelly, supra note 74, at 23-27.
76. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231-32 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a
more detailed discussion of Justice Marshall's philosophical considerations in his opposition
of the death penalty, see Donnelly, supra note 74.
77. The percentage mentioned here, along with percentages in the following
sections of this part, were computed in the production of this article. Each direct appeal by
inmates sentenced to death from the date that Stricklandwas decided until July 1, 2001, has
been researched, and those claims asserting ineffective assistance were cataloged according
to the stage in the trial proceedings in which the error was asserted. Many direct appeals
argued that assistance of counsel was ineffective at more than one stage in the proceedings.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

motion for a new trial.78 Generally, these omissions could be viewed as
tactical decisions. But in some cases, failure to file a motion may be due to
other reasons, such as attorney incompetence.
How should such omissions be treated under the Strickland standard?
The failure to file a motion to suppress can be viewed as deficient
performance on the part of an attorney. Additionally, one might find that
the error prejudiced the defendant. For example, if a motion to suppress
the defendant's confession was not filed, the confession will likely be
admitted into evidence, furnishing damning evidence against the defendant.
If the motion had been filed, even if denied, the defendant would have had
a chance for the suppression of his confession on appeal. Had the motion
been granted, the defendant's confession would not have been entered into
evidence. A failure to file this motion may prejudice the defendant,
because the defendant is barred from the chance of having his confession
suppressed.
A second motion that is frequently filed in capital cases is a motion
for change of venue. Because many of the crimes punishable by death are
publicized intensely throughout the community surrounding the scene of
the crime, a motion for a change of venue may often be warranted to ensure
that the defendant receives a fair trial. In Braun v. Oklahoma,7 9 the
defendant murdered three women while robbing a floral shop in Ardmore,
Oklahoma. 0 The killings in Oklahoma were part of a stream of murders
committed by the defendant, stretching across New Mexico, Kansas, Texas,
and Oklahoma. 8
The killing spree received widespread publicity,
including more than fifty newspaper articles in Oklahoma alone.82 Counsel
filed a motion for change of venue, but did not file three affidavits
supporting the motion, as required by Oklahoma statute.83 The court found
that failing to properly file the motion did not constitute ineffective
assistance, and found that the motion, if filed properly, would have been
denied.84
However, the court overlooked a key consequence of counsel's
omission. Had the motion been properly filed, the required affidavits may
have offered additional evidence regarding the widespread publicity of the
defendant's case. Because the motion was filed improperly, the court was

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See supra note 77.
909 P.2d 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
Id. at 786.
Id.
Id. at 793.

84.

Braun, 909 P.2d at 792-94.

83.

Id. at 792; see also OKLA.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 22, § 561 (West 1992).
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not given the opportunity to consider the additional information.
Therefore, counsel's omission could have made the difference as to
whether the motion to change venue was granted.
Another common error asserted at the pre-trial stage is the failure to
investigate the defendant's psychological background. These errors range
from the simple failure to investigate to the failure to request a hearing to
determine whether the defendant was competent to stand trial. For
example, Durlyn Eddmonds was executed on November 19, 1997, after
being convicted of murder and deviant sexual assault. Before his death, he
claimed on appeal that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
hearing on his fitness to stand trial.85 Eddmonds's attorney stated that he
had thought the defendant had already been adjudicated fit when he was
appointed as counsel.86 The attorney came to this conclusion by reviewing
"some notations on the half sheet and/or some paperwork., 87 Although the
attorney stated that he had serious doubts about the defendant's fitness to
stand trial, he did not request a hearing 88because of his belief that the
defendant had already been adjudicated fit.
One final common error at the pre-trial stage that deserves mention is
the failure to retain experts. Because a large percentage of capital
defendants are provided with state-appointed counsel, the state must
provide funds to pay an expert if one is necessary. Indigent defendants are
at a disadvantage because limited funds are available for their defense.89
Most states have a test to determine whether the defendant is entitled to an
expert. In Oklahoma, the defendant must make a showing of need for the
expert, and must also show that he will be prejudiced by the lack of expert
assistance. 9° The onerous prejudice requirement here, like in Strickland,
virtually ensures that a defendant cannot show that counsel was ineffective
for failing to obtain an expert.
B.

VOIR DIRE

Errors during jury selection account for only nine percent of the
ineffective assistance claims raised by the group studied in this article. 9'
Most of these errors involved one of two claims. One of the primary issues

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

1991).
Illinois v. Eddmonds, 578 N.E.2d 952, 956 (I11.
Id. at 960.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
See Rogers v. Oklahoma, 890 P.2d 959 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
See supra note 77.
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raised included an assertion that voir dire was inadequate in its entirety. In
the alternative, convicted defendants argued that counsel failed to object to
portions of voir dire.92
Charles Stamper, sentenced to death for the murder of three persons in
the course of a robbery,93 claimed that his attorney was ineffective for
failing to perform an adequate voir dire of the venire.94 Counsel did not
question the jurors on pre-trial publicity, their prior knowledge of the case,
or their thoughts on the imposition of the death sentence.95 The court
deferred to counsel's ability to make strategic decisions. The court here
even went so far as to provide the strategy that the attorney pursued.
Counsel, according to the court, "decided in advance of trial ... to gain
96
favor of the jurors by never appearing to conceal anything from them.,
The insufficient examination of the jurors here may have been the cause of
Stamper's conviction, and consequently, his execution.
In Cox v. Arkansas97 the defendant asserted on appeal that his counsel
provoked a juror during voir dire, creating hostility towards the
defendant. 98 The court reiterated the Strickland standard, and summarily
dismissed the claim with little discussion, stating merely that "[t]he record
reveals no hostility in [the juror's answers] . . . ."99 When errors in voir
dire were asserted, the reviewing courts consistently deferred to the lower
court or counsel's power to make strategic decisions in dismissing the
claim.'0 0

92. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arkansas, 900 S.W.2d 940, 948 (Ark. 1995) (claiming
ineffective assistance because counsel did not examine jurors' attitudes towards capital
punishment); Missouri v. Six, 805 S.W.2d 159, 170 (Mo. 1991) (claiming ineffective
assistance because counsel failed to object to allegedly inflammatory questions posed to the
jury by the State); Solomon v. Georgia, 277 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ga. 1981) (claiming ineffective
assistance because defense counsel failed to voir dire prospective jurors on racial prejudice,
considering that defendant was black and the trial was held in a predominantly white
county).
93. Stamper v. Townley, 354 S.E.2d 802, 805 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
94. Id. at 803.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 805.
97. 853 S.W.2d 266 (Ark. 1993).
98. Id. at 273.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arkansas, 900 S.W.2d 940, 948 (Ark. 1995) (rejecting the
issue summarily, by noting that improvident strategy or bad tactics do not alone constitute
ineffective assistance); Derrick v. Texas, 773 S.W.2d 271, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
(disposing of the issue of ineffective voir dire in one paragraph, noting that "[defendant] has
failed to satisfy the ... Strickland standard.").
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TRIAL

The bulk of errors in these defendants' cases occurred at the trial.
Almost half of the errors asserted involve error at the guilt phase of the
capital proceeding.' O' Common trial occurrences that are alleged to
constitute ineffective assistance are: conflict of interest, failure to call or
prepare witnesses, failure to impeach state witnesses, and failure to request
or object to jury instructions. 10 2 In some cases, the defendants alleged that
ethical violations during the course of their
their attorney 0committed
3
1
representation.
1.

Conflict of Interest

The claim that a conflict of interest existed is the most troubling
assertion of error because the Strickland standard is not applied. A conflict
of interest can occur when an attorney engages in multiple
representation. 104 Conflicts of interest may also apply in other situations,
such as where an incompatibility arises between the attorney's private
interests and his duty to the defendant.'0 5
The standard for determining ineffectiveness due to a conflict of
interest was articulated in Cuyler v. Sullivan. 10 6 The Cuyler standard
requires that: 1) counsel actively represented conflicting interests, and 2)
this actual conflict of interest adversely affected the lawyer's
performance.'0 7 A showing of prejudice is not required under the Cuyler

101. See supra note 77.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Stafford v. Oklahoma, 700 P.2d 223, 224 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
The defendant claimed that counsel committed an ethical violation by contracting for
publication rights concerning the defendant's case. See also Stafford v. Oklahoma, 669
P.2d 285, 296 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983).
104. See United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 810 (3d Cir. 1999).
105. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 295 (7th ed. 1999).
106. 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Sullivan, along with two codefendants, was charged with
two counts of first-degree murder. Id. at 337. Attorneys DiBona and Peruto represented all
three defendants throughout the state proceedings. Id. Sullivan had originally had different
counsel at the medical examiner's inquest, but then accepted representation by DiBona and
Peruto because of financial constraints. Id. There was no objection to the multiple
representation by either the defendants or the attorneys. Id. at 337-38. Sullivan was the first
to go to trial, and was convicted on purely circumstantial evidence. Id. at 338. His
codefendants were both acquitted at separate trials. Id.
107. Id. at 348-50.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

standard, fashioning a seemingly lower standard than Strickland.
Conversely, if these two elements are met, prejudice is presumed. 08
Though the Cuyler test for ineffective assistance due to a conflict of
interest purports to be less burdensome than the normal ineffective
assistance test in Strickland, evidence of this lighter burden is non-existent
in death penalty cases. For example, in Nebraska v. Joubert,10 9 the attorney
representing Joubert had previously represented the parents of the child
Joubert had murdered."O The attorney represented the parents of Danny
Joe Eberle in the mid-seventies and filed a bankruptcy petition for the
Eberles in 1984.1'
Although the filing of the bankruptcy petition took
place after Joubert's sentencing, which occurred on October 9, 1984,I12 the
prior representation of the Eberles in the mid-seventies seems to indicate a
conflict of interest. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that no conflict
3
of interest was apparent during the attorney's representation of Joubert. 1
Another disturbing example of a conflict of interest arose in Louisiana
v. Wille.11 4 The attorney who represented Wille was a former state senator,
who pled guilty to the federal felony of submitting a false statement to an
agency of the United States in 1984." 5 The attorney's indictment, guilty
plea, and sentence received intense publicity in St. John the Baptist Parish,
where the attorney resided. 1 6 This Parish was also the same one in which
the defendant was tried."' As punishment for this offense, the attorney
received a three year suspended sentence, and was required to perform over
400 hours of community service. 1 8 Part of the community service
requirement consisted of the representation of the defendant." 9
Wille asserted that a conflict of interest existed between his interest in
an impartial jury and the attorney's interest in avoiding further publicity of
his felony conviction.' 20 Wille further claimed that because of this conflict,

108. Id. at 349-50.
109. 455 N.W.2d 117 (Neb. 1990).
110. Id. at 123-24.
111. Id. at 124.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 126-27.
114. 559 So. 2d 1321 (La. 1990).
115. Id. at 1338.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The attorney had only limited criminal trial experience; he had tried one
felony case before a jury, and had never tried a capital case. The attorney himself admitted,
".I[feel] very, very insecure and unprepared."' Death Row Inmate Wants Retrial, Says
Attorney Was Convicted Felon, BATON ROUGE MORNING ADVOC., Sept. 15, 1990, at 4B.
120. Wille, 559 So. 2d at 1338.
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the attorney failed to question the jurors whether their attitude towards the
defendant would be affected by the fact that a convicted felon, appointed
by the court in order to fulfill his community service hours, represented
Wille.12' The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing, but was
unsuccessful. Wille, like Joubert, was eventually executed. Although the
attorneys in each of these cases had a blatant conflict of interest with their
duty to the defendant, the attorneys here were not found to be ineffective.
2.

Failureto Call or Prepare Witnesses

Another error frequently asserted by capital defendants on appeal is
that the failure of their attorney to call certain witnesses constituted
ineffective assistance. This assertion of error, however, has another
important consideration. Choosing not to call a certain witness
122 may be a
tactical decision by the attorney, and may not amount to error.
Nevertheless, some concern exists as to the way a court handles a
claim of ineffective assistance for failure to call witnesses. Courts seem to
review this point of error in an extremely deferential manner. For example,
the court in Rodden v. Missouri123 gave a one-sentence reason for
dismissing the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance for failure to call
witnesses. In fact, the court merely deferred to the judgment of the trial
court: "The [trial] court found that the failure to call [the witness]
124
represented proper strategic and tactical decision ..
Although the failure to call witnesses is somewhat more problematic
than some other errors, courts should examine these allegations for possible
ineffective assistance. Defense counsel is entrusted with the duty to
advocate the defendant's cause. To ensure that defense counsel has done
this, courts should, when reviewing an allegation of failure to call
witnesses, consider the following: the attorney's overall defense strategy,
the testimony of the absent witness, and any factors that may have affected
the witness's testimony or credibility.
One such example is the case of James Chambers.' 2 5 Chambers was
eventually sentenced to death, but was retried three times, with each

121. Id. As Wille wryly told the ifedia, "'The attorney might be as crooked as his
client [is] supposed to be."' Death Row Inmate Wants Retrial,Says Attorney Was Convicted
Felon, BATON ROUGE MORNING ADVOC., Sept. 15, 1990, at 4B..
122. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 751 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985).
123. 795 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1990).
124. Id. at 396.
125. Missouri v. Chambers, 891 S.W.2d 93 (Mo. 1994).
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reversal or remand involving issues of ineffective assistance of counsel. 26
Chambers was charged with murdering a man outside a country club in
Arnold, Missouri.127
Chambers asserted self-defense, claiming that
Chambers was first thrown to the ground by his victim, and that such
caused him to believe that an imminent danger of serious bodily harm
existed.128 However, counsel at the first two trials failed to call the witness
who could testify to these facts. 129 Finally, after eleven years of battling the
court system, Chambers was convicted after a Missouri trial court heard the
witness's testimony.' 30 The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the
conviction,' 3' and Chambers was executed on November 15, 2000.
3.

Failure to Impeach State Witnesses

Failure of a defense attorney to impeach a prosecution witness also
presents an issue of tactical decision.. An attorney may choose not to
impeach a witness for various, completely sound reasons. 132 However,
some situations arise when impeachment is a necessary element of the
cross-examination of a state's witness. Prior inconsistent testimony is a
situation in which impeachment should occur.
But, in Lowery v. Indiana,'33 the attorney failed to impeach a witness
based on prior inconsistent testimony. A witness for the state testified at
the defendant's first trial, and misidentified a photograph of James Bennett
as the defendant, James Lowery. 134 At the first trial, the witness stated that
the eyes in the photograph looked like the eyes of James Lowery, "but that
the picture was not very good."' 135 Upon further questioning, the witness
36
stated that the photograph looked like a picture of James Lowery.'

126. See Man is Convicted Third Time in Killing Outside Arnold Bar, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 1991, at 10A.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Chambers, 891 S.W.2d at 99.
132. The decision of whether to impeach a witness is a matter of trial strategy, which
ordinarily will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. A defendant can
only succeed on an ineffectiveness claim involving the failure to impeach a witness by
showing that counsel's approach was objectively unreasonable. Illinois v. Pecoraro, 677
N.E.2d 875, 891 (I11.
1997) (citations omitted).
133. 640 N.E.2d 1031 (Ind. 1994).
134. Id. at 1042.
135. Id.
136. Id.

20021

"OUR SYSTEM Is BROKEN"

Counsel did not introduce this inconsistent testimony when the witness
testified at Lowery's second trial. 37 The court merely dismissed this
omission as a tactical decision. Interestingly though, the court in Lowery
noted that "while... one might conclude that the strategy and performance
at issue was not the best,"' 138 the court refused to overturn the verdict due
to ineffective assistance of counsel because "isolated instances of poor
examinations do not necessarily amount to
strategy or inartfully executed
139
ineffectiveness of counsel."'
4.

Jury Instructions

The final error that is frequently claimed by defendants arguing that
counsel was ineffective involves instructions to the jury. Most defendants
asserting this error claim that counsel failed to request a certain jury
instruction, or in the alternative, failed to object to a given jury instruction.
Jury instructions raise another difficult situation on which to judge the
effectiveness of counsel. Failure to request a jury instruction may be a
tactical decision, based upon the idea that the jury will be more likely to
are the only two
find a defendant not guilty, when guilty or not guilty
140
choices available, rather than including lesser offenses.
In Smith v. Indiana,'4 1 the defendant was charged with murder and
43
felony murder. 42 The jury found the defendant guilty of both offenses.
The trial court judge merged the convictions and sentenced Smith to
death.' 44 Smith's defense was that he was at a pool hall the evening the
murder occurred, and that Eggie Lee, a participant in the crime, was lying
about Smith's involvement to protect family members. 45 Although Smith
asserted a defense of alibi, no alibi instruction was tendered to the jury,
notwithstanding the fact that defendant was entitled to an instruction on any

137. Id. at 1043.
138. Id. at 1041.
139. Lowery, 940N.E.2d at 1041.
140. Henderson v. Arkansas, 664 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Ark. 1984). State requested
instructions for first and second degree murder as lesser-included offenses to capital murder.
Defense counsel objected, and the State dropped its request for first-degree murder. The
jury was instructed on capital murder and second-degree murder. Appellant argued that
counsel failed to request a jury instruction on first-degree murder as a lesser-included
offense to capital murder. The court rejected this claim.
141. 547 N.E.2d 817 (Ind. 1989).
142. Id. at 818.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 819.
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defense that had some foundation in the evidence. 46 In fact, Smith's
counsel did not tender
any instructions to the jury during any phase of the
1 47
defendant's trial.
D.

SENTENCING

Slightly more than one-fourth 48 of the executed persons studied in
this article brought claims of ineffective assistance based upon errors that
occurred at the penalty, or sentencing, phase. By far, the most commonly
asserted error at this stage of the proceeding was the failure to investigate
and/or present mitigating evidence. In capital cases, the sentencer must be
permitted to consider any relevant mitigating evidence. 49 Mitigating
evidence is used during the sentencing phase to persuade the sentencer that
the defendant should live.150 Ideally, counsel should consider four ways to
meet this burden. "First, counsel must portray the defendant as a human
being, with positive qualities."' 5' Next, the attorney should attempt to
show that the crimes of this defendant are humanly understandable.' 52 The
defendant, in light of his past history, and circumstances of his formative
development, may not be solely responsible for what he or she is, or the
crime that he or she committed. 53 Counsel should also attempt to "try the
death penalty" and argue against its application in the case. 5 4 Lastly,
counsel must be prepared to rebut any aggravating evidence presented by
the state.'
Although an attorney may choose not to present mitigating
evidence, at a minimum an investigation is warranted to determine whether
crucial mitigating evidence is available and should be presented.
Most courts are in agreement that the failure to offer mitigating
evidence, without more, does not constitute ineffective assistance of

146. Id. at 820.
147. Smith, 547 N.E.2d at 820. The court reversed because of the aggregate
ineffectiveness of counsel during the guilt phase of the trial. Id. at 822.
148. See supra, note 77.
149. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
150. Gary Goodpaster, The Trial For Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 335 (1983).
151. Id. See also California v. Jackson, 618 P.2d 149, 201 (Cal. 1980) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) ("I refuse to believe that on this planet there lives a human being who is utterly
without a single redeeming quality."). Counsel should investigate the defendant's
background, in hopes of finding this redeeming quality.
152. Goodpaster, supra note 150, at 335.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 336.
155. Id. at 337.
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counsel. 5 6 The rationale for this decision rests primarily on two premises.
The first is that mitigating factors can be found in evidence produced at
trial or sentencing, even when the defense presents no mitigating
evidence.' 57 The second premise, not surprisingly, relies on the extreme
deference that is granted to strategic decisions of counsel.' 5 8
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Burris v. Indiana,159 reversed the
defendant's conviction as a result of the attorney's failure to present
mitigating evidence. Substantial mitigating evidence was available, but
none was offered at the sentencing phase.' 60 Evidence showing that Burris
had a troubled background, possessed socially redeeming qualities, and
earned his GED was not even discovered by Burris's trial attorney.' 6' The
court here had previously found that an attorney's "failure to prepare
evidence in mitigation for the penalty phase of a capital case constituted
,.6.Burris's case is one of the
ineffective assistance of counsel ..
frighteningly rare instances in which the death penalty has been reversed on
account of counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence.
In contrast, the defendant in Romero v. Lynaugh163 was not lucky
enough to have his conviction reversed based upon the egregious
performance of his attorney. During the sentencing phase of the
defendant's capital trial, the product of the attorney's "rigorous"
preparation and investigation yielded the following colloquy:
Defense Counsel: Ladies and Gentlemen, I appreciate
the time you took deliberating and the thought you put into
this ...Jesse, stand up. Jesse?
The Defendant: Sir?
Defense Counsel: Stand up.

156. See, e.g., Jones v. Missouri, 767 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 874 (1989); Cochran v. Alabama, 548 So. 2d 1062, 1073 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 900 (1989); Illinois v. Orange, 521 N.E.2d 69 (111. 1988).
1986).
157. See Illinois v. Johnson, 499 N.E.2d 1355, 1372 (I11.
158. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 698.
159. 558 N.E.2d 1067 (Ind. 1990).
160. Id. at 1075.
161. Id. at 1074-76.
162. Id. at 1076 (quoting Smith, 547 N.E.2d at 822).
163. 884 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1989).
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You are an extremely intelligent jury. You've got
that man's life in your hands. You can take it or not.
That's all I have to say.' 64
The defendant was eventually executed. Perhaps the closing argument
presented by the attorney at sentencing and the attorney's lackadaisical
representation of the defendant cost Romero his life.
IV. THE ATTORNEY STILL HAS TO BE AWAKE OR SOBER...
DOESN'T SHE?

The previous discussion begs the question: What does a capital
defendant have to show to successfully demonstrate ineffective assistance
of counsel? Strangely, it appears that effective assistance requires less than
what is required of the average white collar American worker. An attorney
who is either asleep or inebriated at the trial may still be found to have
provided effective assistance to his or her client. Though the following
errors are not frequently asserted by defendants appealing death sentences,
the horror stories of ineffective assistance should be mentioned simply to
show the quality of capital defense that some, mostly indigent, defendants
receive.
In Texas, George McFarland's attorney slept through a substantial
portion of the trial. A journalist covering the trial observed that "every
time [the attorney] opened his eyes, a different prosecution witness was on
the stand."'' 65 When the journalist questioned the attorney about why he
' 66
had slept through the trial, the attorney merely replied: "It's boring."'
Though the trial may be "boring" (at least according to George
McFarland's attorney), counsel may be found ineffective for sleeping
during a capital defendant's trial. In Burdine v. Johnson, 67 another death
penalty case from Texas, the Fifth Circuit found that sleeping counsel
warranted a presumption of prejudice.
Burdine was convicted of

164. Id. at 875. The federal district court vacated the defendant's death sentence,
finding that mitigating evidence, such as Romero's age and intoxication, could have been
presented. Id. at 876. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, in part because the
attorney was "an experienced trial lawyer" who had "engaged in substantial preparation for
trial." Id. at 877. See generally, Richard Klein, Symposium Gideon - A Generation Later:
The Constitutionalizationof Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REv. 1433, 146264(1999).
165. Bruce Shapiro, Sleeping Lawyer Syndrome, THE NATION, Apr. 7, 1997.
166. Id.
167. 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001).
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committing capital murder during a robbery. 68 After exhausting his state
appeals, Burdine applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district
court.1 69 The district court reversed Burdine's death sentence, and the Fifth
Circuit heard the state's appeal. 7 ° The Fifth Circuit originally reversed the
claim, but reconvened en banc7to reconsider and consequently affirmed the
judgment of the district court.' 1
Several witnesses saw Burdine's attorney, Joe Cannon, sleep during
the trial. 7 2 Daniel Strickland, foreman of the jury, remarked that he saw
Cannon doze off between two and five times.1 73 Craig Engelhart, another
juror, recalled that Cannon slept as many as ten times during the trial,
during times when the prosecution was questioning a witness.1 74 The
of time
deputy clerk also noted "that [Cannon]
' 75 was asleep for long periods
witnesses."'
of
questioning
the
during
The Fifth Circuit relied upon the principle that "when a defendant
does not have counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, the
court must presume that such egregious deficiency prejudiced the fairness
of the trial.' 7 6 Upon further analysis, the court declined to adopt a per se
77
rule that sleeping defense counsel merits a presumption of prejudice.
because of sleeping attorneys
Essentially, the doctrine finding prejudice
78
case.'
this
of
facts
the
to
was limited
The court did, however, note that "unconscious counsel equates to no
counsel at all,"'179 because "unconscious counsel does not analyze, object,
listen or in any way exercise judgment on behalf of a client."' 80 The Fifth
Circuit carefully distinguished an unconscious attorney from an intoxicated
attorney, by noting that "[e]ven the intoxicated attorney exercises
judgment, though perhaps impaired, on behalf of his client at all times
during a trial."'' But is the impaired judgment of an intoxicated attorney
really what was contemplated by the doctrine of effective assistance of
counsel?

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 338-39.
Id. at 339-40.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 339.
Burdine, 262 F.3d at 339.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. at349.
Id.
Burdine, 262 F.3d at 349.
Id.
Id.
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Attorneys who are impaired by drugs or alcohol may, in fact, have a
conflict of interest between their drug and alcohol use and their
responsibility to their clients. 81 2 However, courts are extremely reluctant to
find ineffective assistance as a result of the attorney's abuse of alcohol
during the trial. In one capital case, an attorney appeared in court
intoxicated, and the judge subsequently incarcerated the lawyer for one day
so he could regain sobriety. 83 Both the client and the attorney were
transported from the jail to the courthouse the next morning. 184 On a later
claim of ineffective assistance, the court found that the attorney's
85
performance was constitutionally adequate.
John Young, a capital defendant in Georgia, also met his attorney at
the prison 186 -- not for a meeting with his legal counsel, but because his
lawyer had been jailed on drug charges. 87 The lawyer admitted, among
other things, that he was addicted to drugs and did not direct his full
attention towards the trial. 88 The court again found the assistance to Young
to be effective and affirmed his death sentence. 89
In California, a capital defendant was assured by the trial judge that he
had "one of the finest defense counsel in [the] county."' 90 The allegedly
finest defense counsel in San Bernardino County consumed large amounts
of alcohol on each day of the trial.' 9'
Evidence was shown that the
attorney drank "in the morning, during court recesses, and throughout the
evening."' 192 The bailiff also testified that the lawyer "always smelled of
alcohol."'' 93 In fact, on the second day of jury selection, the attorney was
arrested on the way to the courthouse for driving with a .27 blood alcohol

182. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland PrejudiceRequirement, 75 NEB.
L. REV. 425, 470 (1996).

183. Haney v. Alabama, 603 So. 2d 368, 378 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
184. Stephen B. Bright, The Politics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not "Soft on
Crime, " but Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST. Louis. U. L.J. 479, 492 (1995).
185. Haney, 603 So. 2d at 377-78.
186. Bright, supra note 184, at 492. The attorney had admitted in a previous capital
habeas corpus proceeding that he had a drug problem and was convicted of possession of
marijuana shortly after the instant defendant's trial. Id.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489, 1492-93 (11 th Cir. 1984).
190. California v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989) (en bane).
191. Id. at 440.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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from the alcoholism that had plagued
content. 94 The attorney later died
195
trial.
defendant's
the
him during
The preceding examples readily show that establishing ineffective
assistance of counsel is a formidable task. If counsel need not be awake or
sober at trial, what is required of attorneys representing capital defendants?
These examples pare assistance of counsel down to a bare minimum. All
that seems to be required of these attorneys is, in essence, a warm body
sitting next to the defendant in court.
V.

WHY

Do SOME CAPITAL DEFENDANTS RECEIVE SUBSTANDARD
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL?

Several reasons emerge to explain the crisis of ineffective counsel in
American death penalty jurisprudence. The blame does not rest entirely
with capital attorneys. On the contrary, attorneys who practice capital
defense and the clients they represent are hampered by more than one
crippling disability.
A.

THE IMPOSSIBLE STRICKLAND STANDARD

As previously noted in Part I, capital defendants appealing their
convictions face an insurmountable obstacle in asserting ineffective
assistance of counsel, 9 6 which is judged in most states by the Strickland
standard. 197 Judges generally defer to the tactical decisions of counsel,
rather than overturn a conviction on the basis of ineffective assistance.
Therefore, a claim of ineffective assistance on appeal allows only an
infinitesimal chance of success.

194. Id.
195. Id. The court reversed the death sentence on other grounds, but denied the
defendant's claim involving his attorney's intoxication. Id. at 446.
196. See supra notes 20, 21, 27, 35, and accompanying text.
197. See Klein, supra note 164, at 1471. One exception to the use of the Strickland
standard is the state of Hawaii. In Briones v. Hawaii, 848 P.2d 966, 977 n.12 (Haw. 1993),
the Hawaii Supreme Court noted: "We have explicitly rejected the federal standard of
review in ineffective assistance of counsel cases . . . [we] have also rejected the double
burden imposed [by Strickland] and [its] unduly restrictive view of what actions or
omissions of counsel would constitute 'ineffective assistance."' However, because Hawaii
does not have the death penalty, its standard of ineffective assistance is beyond the scope of
this article. See Death Row USA: Death Row Statistics as of July 1, 2002, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DEATHROWUSArecent.pdf (last modified Sep. 6, 2002)
(Hawaii is one of the thirteen states that does not impose capital punishment).
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LOW PAY

Many persons charged with a capital crime do not have the funds to
hire a private attorney. Consequently, the court appoints counsel for the
defendant, generally a public defender. A large portion of these attorneys
are not paid adequately for their work in a complex capital case. 98 The
inadequate resources provided to defend capital cases results in much
preparation of a meaningful defense going undone. 199 Defense lawyers
must spend several hundred hours researching and investigating to properly
prepare for a capital trial.200
Though intensive preparation is required, the compensation provided
for those taking on a capital case is dreadfully insufficient. Average fees
paid to private attorneys range from $2,000 to $25,000 for the entire capital
case. 2° 1 Even at the higher levels of compensation, the hourly rate
generally does not even cover the cost of the attorney's overhead.20 2 The
obstacles are even higher for the public defender appointed to represent a
capital defendant. Most public defenders are underpaid, and contend with
an overwhelming caseload. Arguably, these working conditions may not
attract great numbers of high quality attorneys to public defender offices.
Additionally, even if a diligent, conscientious public defender is assigned a
capital case, he or she will simply not have the time to provide the defense
which the defendant deserves.
Wanda Jean Allen, executed on January 11, 2001, raised the issue of
inadequate pay on appeal from her capital sentence. 0 3 Allen's trial counsel
had never tried a capital case and was only paid $800 for his efforts in
defending Allen.20 4 Seemingly as a result of counsel's inexperience and
inadequate pay, counsel did not discover a report detailing Allen's mental
disabilities.2 5 When Allen's attorney attempted to withdraw from the case,
the Oklahoma court denied the motion, and he was told that he should
"consider representation of [Allen] as part of his ethical obligation to
'2 6
perform pro bono service. 0

198. See Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense
Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 377-80 (1995).
199. Id. at 370-71.
200. Id. at 373.
201. Id. at 381-83.
202. Id. at 380.
203. Allen v. Oklahoma, 871 P.2d 79, 97 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
204. Id. See also InadequateRepresentation,at http://www.archive.aclu.org/
death-penalty/BadCounsel.html (last modified Oct. 14, 2002).
205. See InadequateRepresentation,supra note 204.
206. Allen, 871 P.2d at 98.
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INADEQUATE TIME TO PREPARE/INADEQUATE PREPARATION

Closely related to the issue of inadequate compensation is the issue of
inadequate time to prepare. As previously noted, public defenders are often
saddled with a suffocating load of cases, and cannot devote as much time to
each case as is needed. An example of this "assembly-line" justice can be
seen in many public defender offices across the country.20 7 Public
208
defenders in Atlanta, Georgia handle over 530 felony cases per year.
The "murder task force" in Cook County, Illinois often assigns its public
defenders in excess of twenty murder cases at any one time, with one-third
of those being capital cases.20 9 Public defenders face a formidable task in
providing any of their defendants with adequate representation, especially
complex death penalty cases which require hundreds of hours of
investigation and preparation. Indeed, the American Bar Association has
noted:
One of the most significant impediments to the
furnishing of quality defense services for the poor is the
presence of excessive workloads. All too often . .
attorneys are asked to provide representation in too many
Unfortunately, not even the most able and
cases.
industrious lawyers can provide quality representation
Excessive
when their workloads are unmanageable.
of
the
adversary
to
.
..
weakening
.
.
.lead
workloads
210
system.
The burgeoning caseloads of attorneys offering legal representation to the
indigent make quality representation for each client virtually impossible.
The workload of an attorney handling capital cases should be limited
to allow the attorney to provide each client with quality representation.
The District of Columbia Public Defender Service considers the following
factors in determining the maximum workload for attorneys: quality of
representation, speed of turnover of cases, percentage of cases tried,
availability of support services, and court procedures. 2 1' In order to ensure

207. See Vick, supra note 198 at 389-90.
208. Id. at 391.
209. Id. at 390.
210. STANDARDS CRIM. JUST., Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-4.3, cmt. at
5.48-50 (1974).
211. 1 NAT'L INST. L. ENFORCEMENT & CRIM. JUST., U.S. DEP'T J., THE PUB.
DEFENDER SERV. OF D.C.: AN EXEMPLARY PROJECT, 12-14 (1974).
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that attorneys handling capital cases are assigned only the number of cases
that can be competently managed, the above factors should be taken into
account, as well as the level of complexity inherent in capital cases.
D.

FUNDING FOR EXPERTS

2 2
Experts may be necessary for a plethora of reasons in capital cases. ,
For the attorney defending an indigent capital defendant, however, securing
funding for these experts is often a grueling and futile process. The United
States Supreme Court has noted that a criminal trial is unfair if the state
does not ensure that an indigent defendant "has access to the raw materials
integral to the building of an effective defense. ' '1
Nevertheless, states have been very reluctant to expend the resources
of their taxpayers to procure experts for the defense of capital defendants.
Unlike the prosecuting attorneys, who have an array of experts at their
disposal,21 4 capital defense attorneys may not have any expert assistance in
preparing for trial. 2 5 Defense attorneys may choose to refrain from
requesting these funds, either because they are indifferent to the plight of
their capital defendant, or because they have come to the stark realization
that any request for funds for an expert will be denied.2t 6 In order to
procure funds for an expert, many courts require a showing of need for the
expert. 2 7 However, this may present a no-win situation because the need
for an expert often cannot be demonstrated without the expert assistance
that the defense has requested.

212. Some types of experts that may be necessary include: psychiatrists, medical
examiners, fingerprint experts, medical experts, ballistic experts, and coroners. See, e.g.,
Bright, infra note 214 at 1846-47.

213. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (requiring state to provide access to a
psychiatrist to defendants whose sanity is at issue).

214. Steven B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1845 (1994).

215. Id.at 1846.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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VI. ENACTED (AND LARGELY MEANINGLESS)
STANDARDS TO RAISE THE BAR
A.

LEGISLATION

As a result of the outcry regarding substandard counsel in death
penalty cases, many states that impose the death penalty have enacted
statutes addressing the appointment of counsel in capital cases. Of the
thirty-eight states that have the death penalty, over one-fourth of these
states have enacted legislation regarding standards for counsel in capital
cases. 218 Several of these statutes mandate that two attorneys should be
assigned to capital cases involving an indigent defendant. They also
provide that attorneys defending indigent capital defendants should have
certain qualifications.
Some of these statutes, such as those found in the Georgia Court Rules
and the Alabama Code, offer only a blanket statement governing the
standards for counsel in capital cases. Alabama provides merely that
attorneys representing persons eligible for the death penalty have no less
than five years experience in the practice of criminal law.21 9 Georgia
requires that attorneys in capital cases have "sufficient levels of experience
and competence to afford adequate representation. 2 2 °
Conversely, Utah has enacted higher criterion in determining whether
an attorney is eligible to defend an indigent capital defendant. The Utah
Court Rules state that at least one of the two defense attorneys must have
tried at least six felony cases within the past four years, or a total of twentyfive felony cases.12I Additionally, one of the attorneys must have appeared
as counsel or co-counsel in a felony homicide case.222 The Rule also
provides that one of the two assigned attorneys must have completed or
taught a continuing education course which dealt substantially with the trial
of death penalty cases.223 A number of other state statutes set out similar
standards for determining whether an attorney is qualified to defend a death
penalty case.224

218.

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-54 (West 2002); LA. SUP. CT. R. XXXI (West

Supp. 2002); NEV. SuP. CT. R. 250 (Michie 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.8 (Michie

1950 & Supp. 2002).

219. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-54 (West 2002).
220. GA. UNIFORM SUP. CT.R. 29.8(c) (2002).
221. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 8(b)(1) (Lexis 2002).
222. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 8(b)(2) (Lexis 2002).
223. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 8(b)(3) (Lexis 2002).
224.

See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § CR. 24(B) (West Supp. 2002); NEV. SuP. CT. R.

250 (Michie 2002).
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Though the promulgation of these rules and statutes shows a concern
for the performance of counsel, the standards are rendered virtually
meaningless by a provision contained in some of these statutes. The
provision states that noncompliance with the statute or court rule
mandating the standards for counsel cannot be a ground for establishing
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.2 25 Therefore, although these
statutes establish a standard for capital defense attorneys, the statutes need
not be followed.
The primary reason for this disclaimer is to prohibit defendants from
bringing claims of ineffective assistance when the statutory provisions are
not followed. Additionally, this clause allows for a loophole when an
attorney meeting the specifications of the statute cannot be appointed to the
capital defendant's case. In some instances, difficulty may be encountered
in procuring counsel that meets the prerequisites set forth in the statute.
For that reason, the statute is permissive, rather than mandatory.
While making these statutes and court rules mandatory would ensure
that attorneys who are qualified by the statutory standards represent
indigent defendants, a drawback to a mandatory approach exists. This
change would effectively prohibit attorneys who may not have the
qualifications specified by the statute, but who are willing to represent the
defendant diligently and adequately, from engaging in capital defense for
indigents. Many law schools around the country have programs in which
students, under the direction of a professor, aid indigent defendants on
death row. Should these programs be proscribed from operating because of
the standards present in the statute? In addition, some attorneys diligently
and zealously defend capital indigents while receiving little or no pay, and
demonstrate great effectiveness at trial. Should these attorneys be barred
simply because they do not meet the standards mandated by the statutes?
These important issues merit consideration in determining what should be
done to increase the effectiveness of counsel in death penalty trials.
B.

THE ABA GUIDELINES

The American Bar Association (ABA) has promulgated guidelines for
the performance of counsel in death penalty cases. The ABA Guidelinesfor
the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
("Guidelines") were adopted in 1989, and were written with the assistance
of the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants

225. See, e.g., UTAH R. CRIM. P. 8() (Lexis 2002); VA. CODE
(Lexis 2000 & Supp. 2002).

ANN.

§ 19.2-163.8(D)
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and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.2 26 The stated
purpose of the Guidelines is to "enumerate the minimal resources and
practices necessary to provide effective assistance of counsel. 2 27 The
Guidelines meticulously analyze and provide standards for each portion of
a capital trial, from the number of attorneys to be assigned per case to the
228
duties at sentencing, appeal, post-conviction, and clemency proceedings.
Although the Guidelines are not mandatory for attorneys defending capital
cases, they offer detailed suggestions for attorneys who wish to offer
effective assistance to their death-eligible clients.
The Guidelines propose that the minimum standards promulgated
regarding the representation of non-capital criminal cases are not sufficient
in death penalty cases. 229 Current minimum standards can generally be met
if a "mirror held under counsel's nose clouds up."23 Under the current
standards, otherwise reversible error may be ignored by the court. The
price the capital client must pay for counsel's error is not an improperly
imposed prison term, but his or her life. The Guidelines note that all
aspects of representation should be intensified in a capital case, to ensure
that capital defendants will not die because of an error made by counsel.
For instance, the Guidelines suggest that counsel should present all
reasonably available mitigating evidence unless a strong strategic reason
exists to forego this evidence. Suggestions of mitigating evidence that
should be considered include: medical history, educational history, family
and social history, and military service, if applicable. The Guidelines
specifically note that "counsel may not choose, without investigation and
231
preparation, to sit back and do nothing at sentencing.,
In addition to recommending standards for counsel in death penalty
cases to the judiciary, the ABA called for a moratorium on the death
penalty in 1997, advocating the cessation of all executions until death
penalty cases can be administered fairly and impartially.2 32 The resolution
endeavored to stop all executions until the following goals were achieved:
1) preservation of due process in death penalty cases; 2) competent legal
counsel for all death-eligible defendants; 3) elimination of racial

226. A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES, introductory cmt. (1989) [hereinafter A.B.A. GUIDELINES].
227. Id.
228. See generally, A.B.A. GUIDELINES.

229. A.B.A.

GUIDELINES, supra note 226, at § 11.2.
230. Andrea Neal, For U.S. Death-Row Inmates, a Lawyer Often Isn't Enough, Los
ANGELES DAILY. J.,
Sept. 30, 1986. (discussing the Strickland standard).
231. A.B.A. GUIDELINES, § 11.38.6 cmt. See also Pickens v. Lockhart, 714 F.2d
1455, 1467 (8th Cir. 1983).
232. James Podgers, Time Outfor Executions, 83 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 26.
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discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty; and 4) prevention of
the execution of individuals belonging to groups such as juvenile offenders
and the mentally retarded.233 The proposed moratorium attempts to ensure
that the death penalty is not administered in an arbitrary manner.
Unfortunately, the recommendations by the ABA have been largely
ignored by most of the states allowing the death penalty. Illinois, however,
is one state that has taken steps toward ensuring that the death penalty is
administered fairly. Illinois Governor George Ryan imposed a moratorium
throughout the state on January 31, 2000.234 The moratorium in Illinois was
desperately needed because of the state's pitiful history of sentencing the
innocent to death. Since Illinois reinstated the death penalty in 1977,
thirteen condemned men have been exonerated or spared capital
punishment.235
C.

THE INNOCENCE PROTECTION ACT

The United States Congress has recognized the crisis of second-rate
assistance being provided to capital defendants. Congress is currently
considering a bill known as the Innocence Protection Act ("Act"). 236 The
purpose of this Act is two-fold: to provide for post-conviction DNA
testing, and to establish a competent counsel grant program. 237 Title II of
the proposed Act is geared towards ensuring competent legal service in
capital cases.2 38 The Act seeks to establish a National Commission on
Capital Representation ("Commission").2 39

If the Innocence Protection Act is passed, the Commission would be
responsible for surveying the current systems of appointing counsel for
indigent capital defendants and formulating standards for adequate
representation of these defendants. 240 After assessing the current systems

233. Id. See also Kara Thompson, The ABA's Resolution Callingfor a Moratorium
on Executions: What Jurisdictions Can Do to Ensure that the Death Penalty is Imposed
Responsibly, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1515, 1515 (1998).
234. Patricia Manson, For Defense, Reform Tide is a Buoyant Force, CHI. DAILY. L.
BULL., Apr. 26, 2000, at 1. The Nebraska legislature also voted for a moratorium on
execution, but the moratorium was rejected by Nebraska Governor Mike Johanns. Id.
235. Id.
236. Innocence Protection Act of 2001, S. 486, 107th Congress (2001) [hereinafter
S. 486]; Innocence Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 912, 107th Congress (2001) [hereinafter
H.R. 912].
237. H.R. 912; S. 486.
238. H.R. 912 Tit. II; S. 486 Tit. II.
239. H.R. 912 § 201(a); S. 486 § 201(a).
240. H.R. 912 §201(b)(1), (2); S. 486 § 201(b)(1), (2).
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used to appoint counsel to indigent defendants, ideally, the Commission
will recruit attorneys to represent capital defendants. 24' The Commission is
also charged with monitoring the performance of the recruited, qualified
attorneys. 242 As well as recruiting and monitoring the performance of
attorneys in capital cases, the Commission is also responsible for
reimbursing attorneys for expenses incurred in a capital trial.2 43 These
expenses include: investigators, experts, scientific tests, and necessary
244
support services.
For states to be eligible for a Capital Defense Incentive Grant, as
provided by the Act, 245 states must agree to comply with the standards
promulgated by the Commission,24 6 and must use the grant of funds to train
attorneys to defend capital cases, 247 and to provide experts and other
services necessary to attorneys trying capital cases.248 These funds are not
guaranteed to the states. 249 The incentive grant can be withheld if the state
does not maintain an effective system for providing adequate representation
for capital defendants, in accordance with the standards established by the
Commission.2 5 °
VII. PROPOSED REFORM
Although several efforts have been made, both by the ABA and by
individual states, to increase the quality of counsel in death penalty cases,
these attempts have been largely unsuccessful. Most states, through their
own efforts, have made little progress in ensuring effective representation
for capital defendants. The efforts of the ABA in advocating reform in
death penalty cases has also had little effect on the current state of indigent
death penalty representation. Although these standards were promulgated

241. H.R. 912 § 201(c)(l)(A); S. 486 § 201 (c)(1)(A).
242. H.R. 912 § 201(c)(1)(D); S. 486 § 201 (c)(1)(D).
243. H.R. 912 § 201(c)(3), (4), S. 486 § 201(c)(3), (4). This Section also provides
for the compensation of the attorney's time and service, at an hourly rate in light of the
attorney's qualification and experience, and the local market for legal representation. The
compensation will also take into account the complexity and responsibility of a capital case.
244. H.R. 912 § 201 (c)(4); S. 486 § 201(c)(4). Additional reimbursable expenses
are costs of law clerks and paralegals.
245. H.R. 912 § 207A; S. 486 § 207A.
246. H.R. 912 § 207A(a)(2); S. 486 § 207A(a)(2).
247. H.R. 912 § 207A(b)(l); S. 486 § 207A(b)(l).
248. H.R. 912 § 207A(b)(2); S. 486 § 207A(b)(2).
249. H.R. 912 § 20110; S. 486 § 20110.
250. H.R. 912 § 20110(1)(B); S. 486 § 20110(l)(B).
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as a result of extensive study and research, most states choose not to adopt
them, for unknown reasons.
The statutes enacted by the states establishing standards for counsel
have not improved the current crisis in death penalty jurisprudence.
Though these statutes have been enacted in hopes of solving this problem,
instances of enormously ineffective assistance of counsel are still prevalent
in death penalty cases. Additionally, although these statutes may proscribe
those without certain qualifications from defending capital cases, these
persons may perform far more effectively than others who are "qualified"
under the statute.
The prospect of reform seems somewhat more likely with the
proposed passage of the Innocence Protection Act. The Act will require
states to comply with the standards for counsel set by the Commission in
order to receive grants. This conditional grant program provides an
incentive to the states to work to improve the quality of representation for
capital defendants.
A.

MORATORIUM

The implementation of the Innocence Protection Act is not enough. A
moratorium must be imposed.while proper standards are promulgated to
Additionally, these
ensure capital defendants an adequate defense.
have the requisite
not
may
who
persons
standards cannot exclude those
qualifications (such as a set number of felony trials), but who have the
resources and diligence to offer meticulous representation for capital
defendants. The standards must allow programs to aid indigent defendants,
such as those found at some law schools, to continue. Before any more
executions take place, the death penalty system must be reviewed. The
tragedies that unfold daily in capital litigation must be corrected before any
more innocent persons are sentenced to death, and before more capital
defendants are allowed to proceed with pitifully inadequate counsel.
B.

GREATER RESOURCES

States must also be willing to share some of their own resources to
provide capital defendants with quality representation. Because indigent
defendants often have their entire defense paid for by the state, the amount
contributed by the state for their defense will often determine the
effectiveness of the indigent's defense. The state must contribute enough
resources to indigent defender programs to ensure that each capital
defendant receives adequate representation at trial.
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Whether the federal government or the individual states set adequate
standards for competent representation of capital defendants, the reality
still remains that steps must be taken to resolve the calamity facing deatheligible defendants. In order to guarantee quality representation for all
capital defendants, executions must be stopped until new standards and
rules are enacted to solve the current crisis.
C.

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE COURSES

Even if the Innocence Protection Act is put into place, reform needs to
occur on a more remedial level. All law schools offer some variation of a
Professional Responsibility course that teaches law students about the
ethical restraints placed upon attorneys. Although in some schools this
course touches upon the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, a more
in-depth education is necessary. A course specifically addressing effective
assistance of counsel and how to render effective assistance should be
available in law schools. This should be a required course, but if not, the
course should, at a minimum, be strongly recommended to students.
An "Effective Assistance of Counsel" course, however, would not
concentrate solely on effective assistance in capital trials. To assume all
law students want to practice, or are even interested in, death penalty
litigation is simply unreasonable. Instead, the course should explore ways
to provide effective assistance in both civil and criminal cases. Because of
the crisis in capital defense, however, at least a portion of the course should
be devoted to rendering effective assistance in death penalty cases.
A course such as this would offer each law student multiple benefits.
Students uninterested in criminal or death penalty litigation would learn
how to act competently in civil cases, and dispel a worry many recent law
school graduates have: making an egregious mistake while representing a
client. Additionally, this program would help to ensure that law students
will be armed with a better understanding of ineffective assistance, and
consequently, will be better able to recognize when they, or another
attorney, may be in danger of rendering ineffective assistance.
Capital defendants would also benefit from all law students taking this
course. When an attorney is appointed to a capital case, even if they have
little or no experience in capital defense (as is often the case), the attorney
will at least have some idea of the kind of assistance that he or she is
required to provide to the client. A capital defendant, therefore, will have a
better chance to receive effective assistance from his or her attorney.
Not only would this program benefit capital defendants, but all of the
attorney's clients would benefit. Trial attorneys will be able to represent
their clients to the best of their abilities, keeping in mind the duty to render
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competent legal assistance. Appellate counsel will be more equipped to
spot potential instances of ineffective assistance when perusing a record.
Courts would also benefit by the increased quality of representation.
Judicial efficiency will be fostered by the requirement of an Effective
Assistance of Counsel course. If assistance to clients is of higher quality, it
is reasonable to assume that claims of ineffective assistance and
malpractice actions may decrease, thereby advancing judicial efficiency,
and helping - if only slightly - to unclog dockets.
D. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

Another step that must be taken to reform the imposition of capital
punishment in the United States is to educate those attorneys who have to
defend capital cases. Before an attorney is permitted to engage in capital
defense, he or she should have to enroll in and complete a continuing legal
education course ("CLE") in death penalty litigation. Imposing this
standard on attorneys wishing to practice capital defense would have two
main benefits.
First, this requirement eliminates many of the problems created by a
standard based upon the number of felony jury trials, or other numerically
based standards. This would allow non-practicing attorneys, such as law
professors, to engage in capital defense without having to satisfy a rigid
numerical requirement. A death penalty CLE requirement will allow those
persons to learn about what must be done in order to offer a capital
defendant adequate assistance. This knowledge may be more important
than achieving a set number of completed felony trials.
A second important benefit is that this requirement ensures that every
attorney appointed to a capital case will have at least a basic understanding
of what is involved in a capital trial. Though this still will not be a perfect
substitute for having actual capital defense experience, a capital attorney
will at least understand what a capital trial entails. Although this solution
is not perfect and still presents several problems, it will at least ensure that
attorneys defending capital cases will have some inkling of what is
expected of them as a part of competent representation in a capital case.
CONCLUSION

Capital defendants are often the victims of inadequate representation.
Their convictions are unlikely to be overturned on the basis of ineffective
Moreover,
assistance because of the harsh Strickland standard.
to
a dismal
fallen
cases
has
many
in
defendants
of
capital
representation
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level. Attorneys representing capital defendants, especially those who are
indigent, are hampered by several liabilities, including a suffocating
workload and miserably low pay. Although some states and the ABA have
promulgated guidelines to ensure effective capital representation, these
guidelines and standards have had little, if any, effect on the performance
of many capital attorneys. In order to correct this injustice, executions
must be halted while proper rules and standards are formulated to ensure
that capital defendants receive competent representation in court. These
standards must guarantee that a capital defendant does not pay for his
attorney's error with his life.
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